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The quest for solidarity without victory: constraining the Guatemalan guerilla (1979-1996)
A series of innovative researchers have recently freed the opposition movements of the ‘Third
World’ from their position as passive recipients of Western solidarity. A transnational analysis
of solidarity networks rightly ascribed these actors a formidable agency in constituting and
shaping  solidarity  around  their  causes.  However,  in  focusing  on  large-scale  solidarity
campaigns  such  as  Vietnam,  Chile  and  Nicaragua,  research  has  remained  centered  on
movements whose claim to govern was widely considered as legitimate and was backed by
substantial financial and cultural capital. Solidarity seems to always side with the victors, but
should we too? 
Time has come to include campaigns that  failed to  echo beyond a small  circle  of
activists. By nuancing the observed patterns of active involvement, this paper focuses on the
Guatemalan guerrilla and its solidarity network. By including a campaign based on cripple
and atypical structures, this case study serves as a counter-example for current research, not
with  the  intention  of  questioning  the  validity  of  its  conclusions,  but  rather  to  introduce
diversity in the research field. As a movement not backed by contemporary or previous state
power, how constitutive, dynamic and creative was the Guatemalan guerrilla in organizing
international solidarity? 
What  remains  of  the  previously observed potency of  opposition  movements  when
stripped  off  diplomatic  channels,  direct  encounters,  human  rights  discourses,  legitimacy,
heroic exoticism and capital? The answers to these questions were to be found mainly in the
sociopolitical context that imposed constraints the Guatemalan guerrilla suffered in reaching
out  to  international  solidarity  while  it  also  determined  the  outlook  of  the  network.  The
importance of embedding opposition movements firmly in their local context, reveals itself
even clearer when we compare the solidarity mobilizations for Guatemala and Nicaragua.
Although  launched  almost  simultaneously  and  from  a  shared  starting  point  of  guerrilla
warfare, they nonetheless took very divergent roads.
Although  this  paper  approaches  the  solidarity  movement  with  Guatemala  from  a
transnational perspective, the personal and the anecdotal are never far away when solidarity
intertwines with life stories. The multi-layered history of European solidarity with Guatemala,
would  be  unimaginable  without  the  Flemish  and  Dutch  missionaries  who  spend  years
practicing liberation theology in Guatemalan rural communities,  some of whom lost their
lives  after  setting aside their  vows and joining guerrilla  ranks.  We will,  however, remain
focused on the central debate of agency within transnational networks and the obstacles that
armed opposition movement in general, and the Guatemalan guerrilla in specific, faced in
exercising this agency.  
First constraint: Varying cycles of state terror and revolutionary defeat
The Guatemalan solidarity network suffered an endemic instability due to the varying cycles
of state terror and evolving strategies of counter-insurgency that subjugated the opposition
movement to continuous processes of integration and disintegration. Since the overthrow of
Guatemala’s first  democratically  elected  government  in  the  1950s,  military  regimes  used
incessant violence to crush any revival of the old revolutionary spirit. By the 1970s, however,
an armed insurgency in the highlands and a pacifist movement in the capital confronted the
regime  with  unseen  challenges  and  paralyzed  Guatemala  through  national  strikes.  The
solidarity network was created in the same euphoric state, only heightened by the advances of
the insurgencies raging in El Salvador and Nicaragua where victory seemed ever close.  By
1979, eight western European solidarity committees had found each other in Antwerp for their
first annual meeting and decided on the creation of a network in support of the Guatemalan
popular  organizations.  Initially,  they  did  not  proclaim  explicit  solidarity  with  the  armed
resistance,  although  the  guerrilla  undeniably  played  a  crucial  role  within  Guatemala.  All
hopes were still set on the revolutionary potential of the peaceful movement which, at least
publicly, maintained the same reserved attitude towards the armed resistance. 
In  the  1980s  governmental  anxiety  with  regional  developments  unleashed  a  massive
repressive  campaign.  Fear  dictated  the  solidarity  movement.  Guatemalan  delegations  still
visiting  Europe  testified  anonymously  and  masked,  while  several  opposition  members
allegedly  received  death  threats  while  touring  through  Europe.  The  solidarity  network
eventually collapsed completely as selective assassinations decapitated nearly every popular
organization or forced them underground. The closing of opportunities for peaceful resistance
in turn drove many into joining guerrilla ranks which fueled the emergence of a nation-wide
guerrilla offensive. With their traditional solidarity partners vanished and left empty-handed,
the network was faced with a non-decision: follow or perish. Armed resistance thus became,
to quote, “a justified and the only remaining answer”, and solidarity with the guerrilla their
“only logical and consistent choice”. 
Second constraint: a forcefully divorced solidarity network 
Wholeheartedly  or  not,  the  reorientation  on  radical  solidarity  with  the  guerrillas  proved
problematic.  Primacy had been given to a subversive vanguard that found itself in a total state
of war, chaos and disarray by the scorched earth policy of the military regime. The solidarity
network had no insight whatsoever in the powers at work as they got completely cut off from
the  Guatemalan  opposition.  Previously  discontinuous  flows  of  information  dried  up
completely. If actual encounters with Guatemalan representatives had always been limited,
they came to a complete standstill in the beginning of the 1980s. For years the network was to
function without any foothold or reference point. For members of the solidarity movement to
enter Guatemala freely, in turn, was more impossible than ever before. It remained a no-go
zone for western activists, even more for the many within the solidarity committees who had
fled the country after receiving death threats or losing fellow countrymen. . 
On  top  of  that,  the  Guatemalan  guerrilla  showed  little  interested  in  mobilizing
solidarity,  which  it  received  gratefully  yet  passively.  Confronted  with  heavy  losses,
international solidarity sank lower and lower on the priority list of the guerrillas. The intensity
of the counter-revolution clearly forced the guerrillas to direct their energies towards fighting
for their survival instead of the formation of a strong solidarity network. 
The  minor  solidarity  for  Nicaragua  prior  to  the  military  overthrow  of  Somoza
convincingly  confirms  the  severe  limitations  suffered  by  opposition  movements  seeking
legitimacy for an armed insurgency. Where it’s easy to draw parallels between the solidarity
for  the  Guatemalan  opposition  and  its  Nicaraguan  counterpart  under  Somoza-rule,  the
Sandinista solidarity that arose after the ousting of the dictatorship only offers a perspective of
the solidarity that could have been if the Guatemalan guerrilla had achieved to seize state
power. Sandinista military victory in 1979 was a trigger event that allowed a minimalistic
network to evolve into a revolutionary diplomacy involving entire state agencies designed to
coordinate  international  solidarity.  The  Guatemalan  guerrilla  instead  continued  to  be
subjugated to the same thresholds and barriers that previously reduced Sandinista solidarity to
an ephemeral network. 
Military victory further  allowed the  Sandinista  government  to  set  aside  its  radical
image and invent  a  more  humanitarian  yet  explicitly political  solidarity. The Guatemalan
guerrilla  however  maintained its  violent  rhetoric  and showed little  affinity  with  a  human
rights discourse, neither did it blur the lines between human rights and the armed resistance.
Human rights weren’t an instrument in contesting current military regimes, but a goal to be
single-handedly implemented by violently creating the necessary preconditions. Where the
Sandinista regime could speak in terms of democracy and reconstruction,  the Guatemalan
guerrilla had its hands full with the demolition of the military regime. 
Third constraint: Paralyzing effects of the revolutionary fragmentation, home and abroad 
Nonetheless,  not  all  obstructions  preventing  an  effective  solidarity  can  be reduced to  the
consequences  of  the  repressive  climate  in  which  it  needed to  take  root.  If  the  European
solidarity committees experienced such difficulties connecting to the armed resistance, it was
partly  due  to  the  lack  of  coherence  between  the  guerrillas  who  failed  to  put  forward  a
common political project. Ever since they emerged in the 1960s, strategical disputes severely
challenged  the  Guatemalan  guerrillas.  Two  fundamentally  opposite  point  of  views  on
revolutionary warfare would continue to divide the insurgency. Should the guerrilla limit itself
to warfare, or should it organize and politicize the Guatemalan people in a political movement
that could become a vehicle of the guerrilla agenda? 
The Nicaraguan Sandinistas experienced similar strategical debates. Faced with slow
progress in the overthrow of the dictatorship, the Sandinistas opted for the formation of a
broad anti-Somoza coalition that  could overcome internal frictions and united radical  and
moderate  tendencies  under  one  common  banner  and  leadership.  Internationally,  this
reorientation towards plurality not only allowed the Nicaraguan opposition to appeal to broad
segments  in  the  West,  but  also  permitted  them  to  top-down  reconstruct  the  formerly
fragmented European solidarity network in the same unitary philosophy. 
Although  lacking  the  capacity  to  impose  harmony  within  their  network,  the
Guatemalan guerrillas not only refrained from similar unifying initiatives, they also willfully
maintained the internal antagonism within the European network. Rivalry in Europe was a
mere  reflection  of  the  Guatemalan  reality  in  which  the  factions  barely  cooperated  and
remained embedded in their own frontlines. Accounts of activists are riddled with the fatal
consequences of these deeply rooted divisions. The formation of two opposing blocks did
more than just divide the financial and political weight a unified solidarity movement could
mobilize.  The  two  main  factions  within  the  guerrilla  also  relied  on  separate  clandestine
alliances woven into and functioning within the structures of the official European solidarity
network.  Thus,  adherents  of  both sides  tried  vigorously to  gain  legitimacy for  their  own
faction while preventing excessive influence of the other over the European mainland. The
two clandestine networks were even led by their own ‘ambassadors’ who both roamed Europe
to gather support for their own faction: a Dutch priest turned guerrillero, and Jorge Rosal an
exiled Guatemalan guerrilla commander. The high office the representative combined with his
clandestine activities, was indicative for how deeply the factionalism was engrained in the
highest ranks of the guerrilla.
The hastily creation of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) as an
institutionalized alliance between the guerrillas, brought few changes to the rivalry at home
and  abroad.  Over  the  years  the  European  solidarity  network  had  rightly  argued  that
international support for the guerrilla wasn’t just dependent on the perspective of victory they
offered, but also on the capability of representing themselves as a viable political alternative.
The consolidation of the guerrilla unity initially enabled a divided solidarity network to finally
work together and collectively gather funds in support of the united armed resistance. The
campaign, however, ended in bitter disappointment as some of the factions had claimed and
misused the European funds for their sole benefit. The European solidarity committees were
not shy to condemn the fraud and spoke in terms of manipulation of their solidarity. The
conflict  that  arose marked the birth  of  what  the network called a  ‘critical  solidarity’.  An
increasing amount of activists turned their backs on the armed resistance. 
Fourth constraint: the inevitability of the Guatemalan guerrilla
As  the  guerrillas  were  pushed  back  into  the  Guatemalan  highlands,  revolutionary  defeat
became undeniable. Once a political dialogue with the Guatemalan regime was opened, the
armed insurgency lost much of its mystic appeal. By the middle of the 1980s, the solidarity
movement started showing its first signs of decay. Some committees simply ceased to exist,
while others broke free from the network and reoriented their solidarity towards to the victims
of  the  counter-revolution.  For  the  first  time  they embraced  a  human  rights  discourse  in
defying the military regime. The Flemish committee, for example, gave priority to their quest
for answers in the disappearance and murder of several Flemish priests in Guatemala, and
continues to do so up to the present day. In throwing off its radical and revolutionary image,
more than ever before, it succeeded in finding a sympathetic ear within Belgian politics. 
Nonetheless,  the  decimated  European  solidarity  network  itself  remained  radically
oriented towards the guerrilla. As the guerrilla led the peace talks on behalf of the opposition,
their position at the negotiating table needed to be reinforced. Continuing solidarity became
inevitable but also more reasoned and less activistic. The solidarity network kept itself from
repeating the heroic proclamations of the guerrilla who continued to cultivate the illusion that
military victory was near.
The disproportionate weight the guerrilla still held on the network, was also due to the
eagerly awaited installation of an official representative of the unified Guatemalan guerrilla in
Europe.  After  years  of  unheard  appeals,  the  network  could  finally  count  on  a  tangible
connection  to  the  Guatemalan  resistance,  although  the  guerrilla  showed  little  interest  in
developing a relationship with the solidarity network and allegedly described the resources
brought in by the solidarity movement as “peanuts’. Surprisingly, however, it was commander
Jorge Rosal who was suddenly to become the spokesperson of a united guerrilla after years of
perpetuating internal rivalry through his clandestine activism. Whilst the Sandinista presence
in  Europe  had been the  incarnation  of  the  power  to  convert  the  violent  character  of  the
Nicaraguan revolution into a more humanitarian project suited to broaden political support in
Europe, the Guatemalan commander had been the embodiment of hardline guerrilla warfare
and the lasting factionalism within the solidarity network. His past, as expected, gave him
little credibility in creating a united movement in mutual trust,  which consequently never
came to be. Though the cry for justice gradually found an international platform, solidarity
remained solely directed towards the Guatemalan people as suffering objects,  never to its
armed resistance movement.
 
